McGREGOR W. SCOTT 1 United States Attorney ILED 2 MARY L. GRAD Assistant U.S. Attorney 501 I Street, Suite 10-100 JUN - 5 2006 Sacramento, California 95814 Telephone: (916) 554-2763 4 CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 DEPUTY CLERK 6 7 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 CR-S-02-192-EJG UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 11 Plaintiff, ORDER ON RESENTENCING 12 13 ROBERT W. WARREN, 14 Defendants. 15 On April 28, 2006, the parties appeared before the Court ono 16 the Ninth Circuit's order of limited remand pursuant to United 17 States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2005). The United 18 19 States was represented by Assistant U.S. Attorney. The defendant 20 was represented by Assistant Federal Defender Rachelle Barbour. The defendant was not present pursuant to a filed waiver of 21 appearance. 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27

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For the reasons stated in the attached transcript (Attachment A), had the court known at the time of imposition of the initial sentence in this case that the Sentencing Guidelines were advisory only, the sentence imposed would not have been materially different. SO ORDERED.

United States District Judge

ATTACHMENT A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

. EDWARD J. GARCIA, JUDGE

DEPARTMENT 8, 13th Floor

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

) No. CR. S-02-192

ROBERT W. WARREN,

Defendant.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

April 28, 2006

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: MARY GRAD

Assistant U.S. Attorney

For the Defendant: RACHELLE BARBOUR

Assistant Federal Defender

JILL R MCLEOD, CSR 10071, Official Pro-Tem Reporter

THE CLERK: Criminal S 02-192, United States vs. 1 2 Robert Warren. MS. GRAD: Good morning, your Honor. Mary Grad for the 3 United States. 4 THE COURT: Ms. Grad. 5 MS. BARBOUR: Good morning, your Honor. Rachelle 6 7 Barbour appearing for Mr. Warren. He is not present. The court has allowed him to waive his appearance. He is 8 currently being housed at the Bureau of Prisons. 9 10 THE COURT: Ms. Barbour. This matter is on calendar after a limited remand by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. 11 The remand was pursuant to the Circuit's U.S. v. Amilene 12 Decision for the purpose of having the court determine if the 13 sentence imposed would have been materially different had the 14 15 court known that the federal sentencing guidelines at the time were advisory only, and to proceed accordingly. 16 At the status conference after remand, I invited counsel 17 to file briefs giving their views on the matter and the 18 reasons therefore. Both parties have timely responded with 19 20 written memoranda. I have reviewed the parties' briefs and reviewed my 21 personal notes regarding defendant's initial sentencing and 22 23

the probation officer's presentence investigation reports. I also read the reporter's transcripts of both the entry of plea and the sentencing proceedings in this case, the

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original sentencing proceedings in this case.

Do you wish to be heard further on the motion, excuse me, on the remand, Ms. Barbour?

MS. BARBOUR: Your Honor, I will submit it on my brief that I filed last week.

THE COURT: Ms. Grad?

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MS. GRAD: I will submit it, your Honor.

THE COURT: For the reasons that I will state now on the record, I have determined the sentence of 94 months on this indictment, to which I originally sentenced the defendant pre-Booker, would not have been materially different had I known the federal sentencing guidelines were advisory only.

This individual's sentence of 94 months on this indictment must be viewed under the totality of the circumstances, which included a global plea bargain arrived at by the parties on two essentially separate cases, a portion of which plea bargain the court ultimately rejected.

On the case before the court in Indictment

Number 02-0192, defendant pled guilty to a drug trafficking

charge which carried a statutory mandatory minimum sentence

of 120 months and up to life imprisonment.

Defendant, a major, high level drug dealer with numerous arrests and convictions for narcotics and firearms violations cut a deal with the Government for a sentence of one-half the mandatory minimum, that is, 60-months imprisonment, in return

for his cooperation with the Government and in the prosecution of others.

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Pursuant to this plea agreement, defendant pled guilty pursuant to Federal Rule 11(C)1(C) and remained on pretrial release pending sentence.

With sentencing pending, the defendant committed and was arrested for another drug trafficking offense, distribution of 499.9 grams of cocaine.

He made a deal with the Government on this case also and pled guilty to a lesser charge of use of a telephone to facilitate a drug trafficking offense, which carried a statutory maximum sentence of 48-months imprisonment to run consecutive to the 60-months sentence he had previously plea-bargained for and agreed upon an aggregate sentence of 108 months on the two offenses.

The 11(C)1(C) agreement for the one-half of the statutory minimum, which is the 60 months, began to unravel when the probation officer, in a combined presentence investigation report for the two cases, apparently mistakenly recommended that the two offenses be grouped together for guideline scoring purposes, pursuant to Guideline Section 3(D)1.2, Subdivision D, following the general rule that offenses determined largely on the basis of the drugs.

This resulted in a guideline range for the two grouped -

involved should be grouped together.

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offenses of 360 months to life, which threw the 5(K)1.1sentence of 60 months on the first offense to run consecutive with the 48 months on the second offense, which was somewhat ♠ a cocked hat.

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After two sentencing hearings, during which I heard and agreed with defendant's objections to the probation officer's quideline scoring recommendations, I scored the two offenses separately, so that for the second offense, and the one now before the court, I arrived at a separate guideline range of 188 to 235 months imprisonment. That happened also to be the probation officer's recommendation originally, before the defendant committed his second offense.

I then granted the Government's 5(K)1.1 motion and departed down to 94 months, one-half of the low end of the quideline range.

Since the Federal Rule 11(C)1(C) agreement called for a 60-month sentence, I gave the defendant the option of withdrawing his guilty plea. However, he declined, after I told him that I was going to sentence him to 94 months, and stood by his guilty plea.

.I then entered judgment, fixing his sentence at 94-months imprisonment to run consecutive with the 48-months sentence on the other offenses, for an aggregate sentence of 2.24 142-months imprisonment.

. The reason it's important, in my judgment, to view the

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two sentences together, that is, in the aggregate, is because the 142-months imprisonment sentence, in my judgment, was an appropriate sentence for defendant's total offense conduct. The second offense for drug trafficking was particularly egregious, being committed not only while on presentence release but while, ostensibly, cooperating with the Government DEA agents; and yet, the sentence of 94 months did reward defendant for his cooperation, handsomely I believe, albeit not as leniently as he had originally bargained for.

So had I known that the guidelines were advisory only when I originally sentenced the defendant, I would have analyzed and reasoned the sentence in this case essentially the same.

I would have first determined the appropriate guideline ranges, including the 5(K)1.1 downward departure motion, determined whether there was any basis for other upward or downward departures, then considered if there was any justification for outside the advisory guideline war then considered Section 3553(A) of Title 18 U.S. Code.

Thus, this 94-month sentence coupled with the 48-month sentence would have been within the advisory guideline range and addresses relevant Section 3533(A) factors. It reflects the seriousness of the offense and provides just punishment. It affords adequate determents, both individual and general, 25 4 and protects the public from further crimes by the defendant;

1 at least for some 16 and a half years, including the five-year period of supervised release. 2 3 As for defendant's perception that the court seemed 4 restrained by the low end of the mandatory guideline range, 5 defendant is mistaken. Even had the guidelines been advisory only, defendant's breach of the plea agreement in the instant 6 7 case by committing the second drug trafficking offense overrode any consideration for further leniency by going 8 9 below 50 percent off the low end of the advisory guideline range on the Government's 5(K)1.1 motion. 10 11 I will ask the U.S. to prepare and submit a proposed summary order of the court's decision on remand for my 1.2 13 signature. 14 Anything further for now, Ms. Barbour? 15 MS. BARBOUR: No, your Honor. Thank you. 16 THE COURT: Ms. Grad? 17 MS. GRAD: No, your Honor. Thank you. 18 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Counsel. (The proceedings were concluded.) 19 20 21 22 23 24

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1 STATE OF CALIFORNIA) ss. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO) 2 3 I, JILL R. MCLEOD, Official Pro-Tem Reporter of the 4 United States District Court, Eastern District of California, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages, 1-8, comprise a б full, true and correct transcription of my stenographic notes 7 in the aforementioned case of the proceedings held on 8 April 28, 2006. 9 10 11 Dated this 28th day of May, 2006. 12 13 Jui R. Muskera . 14 JILL R. MCLEOD, CSR 10071 1.5. 16 17 1.8 19 20 21 23 23 2.4 24